Side Channel Resistance Evaluation and Measurement

While unknown to most people, hardware implementation attacks provide a serious adversary for systems that contain sensitive data. Mission critical information can be extracted from a design with little effort from an attacker when they have access to the physical hardware. Thus designers try to mitigate this problem by using unique countermeasures styles. This work presents the first practical differential power analysis security evaluation of a countermeasure style called t-private logic. A PRESENT block cipher S-Box was implemented on a Virtex 5 FPGA as a reference platform. Both hardware and simulated power traces were collected. Statistical analyses were performed (CPA and Correlation enhanced collision attack) and our results revealed a first-order side channel attack vulnerability

Green Technology Commercialization An Analysis of the EPA’s SBIR Program

The purpose of this project was to identify how the EPA SBIR program can effectively utilize its limited funding by selecting and supporting small green business entrepreneurs with the greatest potential for bringing products to market. We interviewed representatives both from companies that successfully and unsuccessfully commercialized their technologies. Our team additionally contacted managers of similar programs, including other federal agencies’ SBIR programs, a green technology accelerator, and a venture capitalist company. We also distributed an electronic questionnaire to principal investigators. From the collected data, we developed a list of recommendations for the EPA’s SBIR selection and support processes